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Overview—For a variety of reasons—some related to
the nation’s lack of universal health care coverage,
others related to basic barriers to access—the unin-
sured, underinsured, and others lacking access to
health care have come to depend on a loosely woven
safety net of providers committed to seeing that they
receive medical attention. This background paper
serves as the foundation for three upcoming National
Health Policy Forum meetings on the difficulties
confronting this safety net. Against the backdrop of last
year’s report issued by the Institute of Medicine (IOM),
America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact but Endan-
gered, the paper reviews the recurrent choice in U.S.
health care policy between underwriting public insur-
ance coverage and subsidizing direct provision of
health care. After noting reasons for direct federal
interest in the safety net and the major findings of the
IOM report, the paper looks at the distinction between
core safety-net providers and other health care provid-
ers offering safety-net services as well as at local
variation in the safety net. The paper then turns to what
is known about uninsured Americans and the determi-
nants, dynamics, and medical consequences of un-
insurance. Also reviewed are the financial underpin-
nings of the safety net, including Medicaid (its major
source of funding), Medicare, and the intricate system
of cross-subsidies that allow safety-net providers to
offer uncompensated care. Referencing the principal
threats that confront the safety net, such as managed
care and competition for insured patients, possible cuts
in direct and indirect subsidies, and growth in the
numbers of uninsured Americans, the paper goes on to
examine the particular jeopardy facing hospital emer-
gency rooms.
Inevitably, in discussions of proposals for expanding
health insurance coverage in this country, the point is
made that no American has to go without health care
simply because he or she lacks adequate insurance
coverage or cannot afford to pay for treatment. This
assertion implicitly refers to the nation’s safety-net
providers, who have committed—to a greater or lesser
degree—to provide health care to people, regardless of
their ability to pay. Safety-net providers include certain
hospitals (such as public and some community facilities),
community and migrant health centers, rural health
clinics, local health departments, nurse-managed centers,
most teaching hospitals, many physicians and other
individual practitioners, and numerous other providers
who care for a disproportionate percentage of patients
who are uninsured, underinsured, or covered by Medicaid
or who face special conditions such as AIDS, serious
mental illness, or homelessness. (The uninsured popula-
tion alone totaled 42.6 million in 1999—about one in six
Americans.)
While few would question the crucial role played by
the health care safety net in the United States, there is
disagreement over its adequacy and sufficiency—and
over its capacity to withstand current trends in third-
party reimbursement and in the general market for
health care. Certainly, the strength, depth, and composi-
tion of the safety net varies greatly from region to
region, state to state, and locality to locality. Moreover,
the safety net has some evident holes—for example, it
is more likely to provide care for serious illnesses than
offer preventive services and more likely to attend to
acute than chronic illnesses.
James Mongan, president of the Massachusetts
General Hospital, commented in a Washington Post op-
ed piece last October:
Many Americans do not understand, or choose not to
understand, the impact of being uninsured. Many
assume that the uninsured get help when they need it,
and in a sense they are right—but also very wrong. For
some acute, visible episodes such as childbirth or a
broken leg, almost everybody does get treatment. What
is not well understood is that the uninsured often do not
receive care for many serious illnesses, such as cancer,
diabetes, and hypertension, and in many instances defer
care until their illness has reached an advanced stage.1
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a consensus that
the health care safety net plays an important auxiliary
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role in health care delivery. It its report on the safety net
issued last year, America’s Health Care Safety Net:
Intact but Endangered, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
concluded: “In the absence of universal comprehensive
coverage, the health care safety net has served as the
default system for caring for many of the nation’s
uninsured and vulnerable populations.”2 
Given the demise of the Clinton health reform
proposal of 1993–1994, most observers seem to agree
that universal coverage is not going to materialize in the
foreseeable future. A reexamination of the safety net as
a means of providing health care to those with no other
recourse therefore seems in order.
Such an examination is timely because of the Bush
administration’s commitment during the 2000 presiden-
tial campaign to add 1,200 community health centers
over the next five years. In addition, the 107th Congress
has already shown interest in the safety net, in part
because a number of federal safety net programs,
including community and migrant health centers, are up
for reauthorization.3 Furthermore, the National Gover-
nors’ Association has proposed a radical restructuring
of the Medicaid program, which would allow it to cover
a larger portion of the indigent population with a less
rich benefit package, potentially relieving some of the
pressures on safety-net providers.4 Yet, Medicaid is
becoming increasingly vulnerable in many states;
according to data from the National Conference of State
Legislatures for early March 2001, 23 states and the
District of Columbia are experiencing Medicaid cost
overruns.5
While the safety net is primarily defined at the local
level across the country, there are numerous reasons for
federal interest in safety-net policy, among them:
 Medicaid is the single largest source of safety-net
patient revenue.
 Federal statute governs patient treatment in hospital
emergency rooms (ERs) across the United States.
 To varying degrees, federal tax laws and entitlement
programs have an impact on who has access to
health insurance coverage and who is left out.
 If the safety net were to fail, there would be major
public health consequences for all residents of the
United States.
Even if there were near universal coverage, arguably
there would also be a residual role for safety-net provid-
ers, who offer the accessibility, cultural competence,
and other consumer-friendly features that many main-
stream providers do not. As Julius Richmond and Rashi
Fein pointed out in a commentary they published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association over six
years ago: “Important as universal insurance is, it is
access that we seek.”6 In other words, insurance alone
does not guarantee an individual access to health care;
obstacles such as shortages of providers, difficulties in
enrollment, geographic distances, and language and
other cultural differences can still impede access.
BACKGROUND
While the very title of the IOM’s recent report—
America’s Health Care Safety Net: Intact but Endan-
gered—suggests a somewhat unprecedented crisis, the
text of the report indicates that the problems are
chronic: “The funding and organization of the safety net
have always been tenuous and subject to the changing
tides of politics, available resources, and public poli-
cies.” It is instead the timing and the nature of the
financial threats facing the safety net that are unprece-
dented. A simultaneous combination of what has been
called “our nation’s uninsurance epidemic,”7 expansion
of managed care in both the public and private sectors,
threats to public subsidies for the safety net, escalating
costs, and increased general competition has brought
extraordinary pressures to bear on safety-net providers.
One of the basic features of the safety net is that its
providers are essentially the providers of last resort. In a
New York Times interview, the medical director of the
nation’s oldest public hospital, Bellevue Hospital in
Manhattan, observed: “When you’re at Bellevue, there
is no elsewhere.”8 Without alternatives, he had nowhere
else to refer patients—it was his physicians who treated
them and the hospital that absorbed the cost of their care.
Furthermore, the populations served by safety-net
providers are generally both difficult and expensive.
Raymond Baxter, a member of the IOM safety-net
committee, and Robert Mechanic, co-authors of a recent
Health Affairs article, observe:
[These safety-net patients] range from the uninsured
and Medicaid populations to a broader array of
vulnerable populations, including persons with acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), substance abus-
ers, the frail elderly, low-income children, and pregnant
women, the homeless, and the mentally ill.9
Quite literally, this is a patient load like that faced by no
other set of providers.
In their study of the rise and fall of the Clinton
health reform proposal, The System, Haynes Johnson
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and David Broder graphically describe the two-level
system of health care that those with coverage and those
without coverage confront—in the context of metropoli-
tan Los Angeles:
“If you have insurance, you go to Cedars[-Sinai
Medical Center],” [a local hospital association offi-
cial] said. “If you don’t, you go to L.A. County
[Medical Center], where you wait for hours, days, and
months to get your health care.” . . . We have a
shadow system called the public system. Because that
system has been inadequately funded and faces excess
demands on its services, public hospitals and clinics
have been forced to subsidize the care they provide by
paying low salaries and hiring people who are either
willing to accept a lower salary or who cannot be
hired anyplace else. Without reform of the entire
system, they were now at the additional disadvantage
of having to be competitive in the private marketplace
without the resources to compete in it.10
While the point Johnson and Broder make is not valid
for all safety-net providers, there are concerns about
how core safety-net providers can sustain quality with-
out adequate resources.
The safety net in rural America faces its own set of
special challenges. In some rural locales, virtually every
provider is a safety-net provider. Recruitment and
retention pose special difficulties in rural settings.
Geographic distances, combined with poor, if not
nonexistent, public transportation, make access to care
difficult. Both poverty and uninsurance levels are
generally much higher—and typically increase the
farther away people reside from urban areas. And the
challenges to maintaining the financial viability of all
types of providers from individual practitioners to
community hospitals are especially daunting, given
their small-scale operations. All of these factors com-
bine to make the rural safety net especially susceptible
to the threats that confront safety-net providers in urban
and suburban settings across the country.
Insurance Coverage vs. Subsidized Access:
Recurring Choices in American Health Policy
Over the past half century, federal health policy
makers have repeatedly faced the choice between cover-
ing Americans through some sort of subsidized health
insurance program and offering subsidies for the direct
provision of health care, typically through institution-
based health care providers. After World War II, during
the Truman administration, the choice was between the
Wagner-Murphy-Dingell bill, which offered universal
health insurance coverage, and what became the Hill-
Burton Act, which provided federal subsidies for hospital
construction in underserved areas; Congress chose the
latter option.11 In 1965, when Lyndon Johnson was
president, Congress enacted less-than-universal coverage
in Medicare and Medicaid but augmented it through a
program of neighborhood health centers in low-income
areas. The National Health Services Corps helped to fund
a network of practitioners in areas with shortages of
individual health providers.
Karen Davis and Cathy Schoen capture some of the
thinking during the 1960s that went into the neighbor-
hood health center program, which eventually evolved
into today’s community and migrant health centers:
[Federal] planners argued persuasively that only a
health center, as opposed to health insurance, could,
in addition to financing services, simultaneously treat
a variety of causes of deficient medical care common
to poverty areas such as the scarcity of physicians and
health facilities; inadequate transportation to areas
with more abundant resources; crowded facilities with
long waits and care that was frequently impersonal or
minimal; physicians who, pressed for time, seldom
undertook extensive workups, provided counseling, or
explained fully the nature and importance of a pre-
scribed treatment; and discriminatory practices that
restricted the access of minority groups to sources of
care open to whites.12
Moreover, it is important to remember that even
existing public benefit programs, such as Medicaid
itself and the more recently enacted State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), have never suc-
ceeded in enrolling all those eligible for their services,
despite sizable recent appropriations for outreach and
enhanced flexibility.13 Larry Gage, president of the
National Association of Public Hospitals and Health
Systems (NAPH), suggests: “Based on our failure thus
far to sign up millions of people who are already
eligible for Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insur-
ance Program . . , and other public coverage, any . . .
health care reform efforts must be augmented by support
for institutional safety-net providers.” In other words, it is
not a matter of either public insurance coverage or
subsidies for access through safety-net providers—but
of both. Moreover, insurance coverage does not
guarantee access to care.
Others note that, for a variety of reasons, certain
populations may never be covered by public insurance
programs. These include groups such as homeless
people and Americans with serious and persistent
mental illness, who may elude coverage to which they
are entitled. These people are often difficult to enroll
and may be easier to serve in safety-net settings. They
also include groups such as certain legal or illegal
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immigrants, whom federal lawmakers may as a matter
of public policy choose not to make eligible for compre-
hensive coverage. Yet, simply as a matter of protecting
the public health, it may be desirable to provide some
minimum level of treatment, even to people who reside
illegally in the United States. Some would suggest that
the most efficient way of doing that is through safety-
net providers.
Finally, some observers point out that subsidies to
public providers do not always assure access to the
whole range of needed services. For example, while
many community and migrant health centers have
arranged specialty and subspecialty referral networks,
many others complain that they cannot get their indi-
gent patients seen when their needs warrant more than
attention by primary practitioners. This is obviously a
lesser problem for safety-net patients whose medical
homes are hospitals of last resort, ERs, and/or tertiary
care institutions whose staffs are likely to include
specialists and subspecialists. But where such gaps are
likely to occur—especially in primary care safety-net
settings—patients are likely to experience repeated
visits for recurring complaints.
The Direct Federal Interest in the Safety Net
Because the health care safety net varies according
to local circumstances, no one can really speak of a
national safety net. As the IOM report notes:
The nation’s health care safety net is . . . a patchwork
of institutions, financing, and programs that vary
dramatically across the country as a result of a broad
range of economic, political, and structural factors.
These factors include the strength and configuration
of the local economy, the numbers and concentration
of poor and uninsured individuals, the structure of the
local tax base, the depth and breadth of a State’s
Medicaid eligibility and benefits, and the commu-
nity’s historic commitment to care for the uninsured
and other vulnerable populations.
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why
federal policymakers have a direct interest in the
strength of the safety net:
 The Medicaid program is the major source of
revenue for safety-net providers. The IOM report
underscores the central importance of Medicaid to
funding the safety net:
Over the years, Medicaid has become the finan-
cial underpinning of the safety net [emphasis
added]. Historically, Medicaid has furnished the
majority of insured patients for most safety net
providers and has subsidized a substantial portion
of care for the uninsured through such programs
as disproportionate share hospital (DSH) pay-
ments and cost-based reimbursement for federally
qualified health centers [FQHCs].
No other funding source approximates Medicaid in
importance for the safety net.
 A number of other federal grant-in-aid programs
also provide financial support for the safety net.
The Section 330 program authorized under the
Public Health Service Act subsidizes community
and migrant health centers, the largest formal federal
component of the safety net outside of Medicaid;
approximately 700 health centers with nearly 3,000
clinics and a network of 6,500 primary care clini-
cians provide services to more than 9 million
people.14 The Indian Health Service currently serves
some 1.5 million American Indians and Alaska
Natives in 34 states through a system that includes
37 hospitals, 64 health centers, 50 health stations,
and five school health centers. The Department of
Health and Human Services’ Division of Nursing,
Bureau of Health Professions, Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), has spurred the
development of nurse-managed care centers. The
Ryan White program for people with HIV/AIDS and
the Stuart McKinney program for the homeless also
help support safety-net providers. In addition, the
Medicare program, through its direct payments to
providers as well as its DSH payments for Medicare
and low-income patients and its support for graduate
medical education (GME)—especially its IME
(indirect medical education) component—helps fund
safety-net providers. Some health workforce initia-
tives also support the safety net; for example, the
National Health Service Corps has traditionally
supplied physicians to inner-city and rural commu-
nity health centers and other facilities.
 Federal law requires hospital emergency rooms
across the country to treat patients regardless of
their ability to pay. The Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA)
guarantees everyone residing in the United States
hospital-based emergency treatment for severe
illnesses and injuries. In essence, it is an unfunded
mandate whose incidence is heaviest on hospitals
who choose to staff emergency rooms, particularly
those located in certain urban and rural areas,
where the concentration of uninsured patients is the
highest. Hospitals that fail to comply with
EMTALA will lose their Medicare provider status
—and hence their ability to collect the Medicare
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revenues on which virtually all hospitals depend
for their existence.
 To some extent, federal income tax law and the
eligibility provisions for such federal entitlement
programs as Medicare and Medicaid combine to
determine who is uninsured or underinsured in the
United States. Employers’ health insurance premi-
ums are fully deductible from their federal income
and social security payroll taxes. Almost two-thirds
of Americans receive health insurance coverage
because their employer (or a family member’s
employer) utilizes this tax-advantaged form of
supplementary remuneration. A sizable portion of
the remainder of the population receives its coverage
through either the federal Medicare or Medicaid
programs. Thus, to the extent that people are unin-
sured or underinsured and dependent on the safety
net, it is largely because they do not have access to
this tax-subsidized system and public programs such
as Medicare and Medicaid.
 If the safety net were to fail in its mission, there
would be public health consequences for all Amer-
icans. One of the many roles of the safety net is to
contain the spread of contagious diseases and
thereby protect the general population. Insofar as the
safety net is unable to meet this challenge, the public
health would be jeopardized, and the need for
government intervention on a broader scale than
local government would grow. Otherwise, threats to
the population as a whole, such as multidrug-resis-
tant tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases
(including HIV/AIDS), hanta virus, measles, and
influenza—none of which respects state or local
boundaries—might ultimately require federal-level
attention, ultimately through the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). Similarly, insofar as
the safety-net services, such as emergency depart-
ments, shock trauma care, neonatal intensive care,
and burn units, that are offered to the general public
are jeopardized because of their linkage to the
financial well-being of the safety-net providers, the
welfare of the general population itself may be
threatened.
The Safety Net Over Time
Echoing the biblical “ye have the poor always with
you,” one of the co-editors of the IOM report, Stuart
Altman, and Uwe Reinhardt and Alexandra Shields, his
co-editors of another recent volume, observe:
The phenomenon of the uninsured and the underinsured
in the United States is not new. It has been a permanent
feature of the American health system. The number [of
uninsured] stood at close to one-third of the U.S.
population before the introduction of Medicare and
Medicaid in the mid-1960s. Thereafter, it gradually fell
to about 12 percent of the population in the late 1970s.
Since that time, it has risen steadily, reaching the current
proportion of more than 15 percent. . . . In many parts of
the United States—for example, in California—it
already exceeds 25 percent.15
Over the years, America’s health care safety net has
metamorphosed from a system composed primarily of
charity hospitals and clinics, backed up by some private
practitioners who offered charity medicine, to a system
after World War II that also included community
hospitals, which gradually assumed varying degrees of
safety-net responsibility. Then, with the advent of the
“Great Society,” came the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965, which offered, respectively, near-
universal coverage for the elderly and disabled and
limited coverage for the primarily welfare-related
indigent population. Even these programs have had
their shortcomings. Gage points out:
Many thought that the enactment of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs would eliminate the need for
public charity hospitals. But that just didn’t happen.
From the outset, the Medicaid program never covered
all of the population living in poverty, and after a few
years of early growth, Medicaid coverage declined
dramatically. From a 1976 high-water mark of 65
percent of all individuals living in poverty or near
poverty, Medicaid covered fewer than 45 percent by
the early 1980s.16
Despite some expansion in coverage in the late 1980s
for children and pregnant women, the proportion of
poor Americans covered by Medicaid in 1999 stood at
40.9 percent. Even Medicare, though it covers all but a
small percentage of Americans over 65, provides
coverage for a shrinking portion of the total cost of their
care. HCFA estimates that the program now covers less
than half of the total medical expenses of the elderly
and that the average older person spends 18 percent of
his or her after-tax income on health care, up from 10
percent in 1972.
Despite serious consideration of several intervening
universal coverage proposals, culminating in the
Clinton administration’s abortive national health
insurance proposal of 1993-1994, the emphasis of
legislation enacted in recent years has been on incre-
mental change. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
scope of income eligibility of the Medicaid program
was expanded to encompass an increasing percentage
of the indigent population. Then, in the years 1995 to
1997, a bipartisan consensus developed that a larger
7 
group of low-income uninsured children should receive
federally subsidized coverage. The enactment of the
State Children’s Health Insurance Program in August
1997 ensued. By early 2001, SCHIP had succeeded in
enrolling a total of 3.3 million children. In 1996,
Medicaid eligibility had been delinked from eligibility
for a new program, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), which was enacted to succeed Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) as part of
welfare reform. To some extent, this delinking led to an
initial decline in the number of Medicaid enrollees;
between June 1997 and June 1998, Medicaid enroll-
ment dropped from 31.3 million to 30.7 million. How-
ever, it then rebounded to 30.9 million in December
1998, to 31.4 million in June 1999, and to 32.0 million
in December 1999.17 There is evidence that outreach for
the SCHIP program helped boost Medicaid enrollment.
The IOM Report
Issued in March 2000, America’s Health Care
Safety Net: Intact but Endangered was commissioned
by HRSA
to examine the impact of Medicaid managed care and
other changes in health care coverage on the future
integrity and viability of safety-net providers, particu-
larly core safety-net providers such as community
health centers, public hospitals, and local health
departments.
Even before enumerating its findings, the IOM commit-
tee noted that it “was struck by the dearth of reliable
and consistent data that can be used to accurately
assess, measure, or compare the changing status of
safety-net systems across the country.”
The IOM committee went on to conclude:
 The shift to Medicaid managed care can have
adverse effects on core safety-net providers and
the uninsured and other vulnerable populations
who rely on them.
 Managed care principles offer significant poten-
tial for improved health care for Medicaid pa-
tients [served by safety-net providers], but imple-
mentation problems can undermine this potential.
 The financial viability of core safety-net providers
is even more at risk today than in the past because
of the combined effects of three major dynamics:
(1) the rising number of uninsured individuals; (2)
the full impact of mandated Medicaid managed
care in a more competitive health care market-
place; and (3) the erosion and uncertainty of
major direct and indirect subsidies that have
helped support safety-net functions.
 The . . . availability of care for the uninsured and
other vulnerable populations increasingly depends
on where they live.
 The committee found that most safety-net provid-
ers have thus far been able to adapt to the chang-
ing environment. Even for these providers, how-
ever, the stresses of these changes have made it
increasingly difficult for them to maintain their
missions while protecting their financial margins.
The IOM report has been criticized by some because
it focuses primarily on HRSA-funded community and
migrant health centers and other core safety-net providers
and pays relatively little attention to other safety-net
providers, such as community hospitals and emergency
rooms, even though such providers, in aggregate, play a
larger role in providing care to the uninsured, underin-
sured, Medicaid beneficiaries, and special populations.
Some critics have pointed out that it focuses more heavily
on public than private safety-net providers, despite
evidence of the growing importance of the latter.
Some have also criticized the IOM report as a bit too
oriented to maintaining the current array of safety-net
providers, especially those constituting the core safety
net. For example, Thomas Chapman, president and chief
executive officer of the Health Services for Children
Foundation, commented soon after the report appeared:
 The challenge the IOM report presents is to simulta-
neously boost access to primary care while reducing
excess capacity. What’s needed is a dedicated redesign
strategy that doesn’t try to maintain the status quo by
simply spending new healthcare dollars the same way.18
THE SAFETY NET AND ITS
COMPONENT PROVIDERS
The IOM report defines the safety net as “those
providers that organize and deliver a significant level of
health care and other related services to uninsured,
Medicaid, and other vulnerable populations.” Baxter
and Mechanic posit a slightly different definition: “the
institutions, programs, and professionals devoting
substantial resources to serving the uninsured or so-
cially disadvantaged.” This background paper also
includes mention of the underinsured and those who
experience difficulty obtaining health care from
non–safety-net providers.
The Core Safety Net and the Broader
Universe of Health Care Providers
Most discussions of the safety net distinguish
between the “core safety-net” and other health care
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providers that may assume safety-net functions. Ac-
cording to the IOM, core safety-net providers have two
basic characteristics:
 Either by legal mandate or explicitly adopted mission
they maintain an “open door,” offering access to
services for patients regardless of their ability to pay.
 A substantial share of their patient mix is uninsured,
Medicaid, and other vulnerable patients.
Core safety-net providers are those who recognize a
principal role or mission in treating the uninsured,
underinsured, or vulnerable patients and do not shun
them because they have no coverage, are expensive or
difficult to treat, and/or are less desirable patients.
Non–safety-net providers often choose to avoid these
populations for reasons related to their own economic
viability. With the exception of the EMTALA mandate,
the safety net is strictly a voluntary system. Yet even
safety-net providers can ultimately approach a financial
“tipping point” beyond which they cannot accept
patients without coverage or personal financial re-
sources. That is why some have made the comment: “no
margin, no mission.” Among those typically considered
core safety-net providers are public hospitals, commu-
nity and migrant health centers (also known as FQHCs),
and local health departments; in some communities,
they may also include teaching hospitals and rural
community hospitals. In most communities, smaller
special service programs, including school-based health
programs, nursing centers, rural health clinics, Ryan
White AIDS programs, and family planning programs,
are also considered core safety-net components.
It is not unusual in many communities for other pro-
viders to assume a substantial safety-net role, too. These
may include community hospitals or religiously affiliated
institutions with missions to serve the indigent, as well as
private physicians committed to offering a substantial
amount of “charity care.” Some have referred to these
providers as the “invisible safety net,” since they often
receive less public attention. The amount of such charity
or uncompensated care is likely to vary a great deal from
area to area, however, and to depend, among other things,
on the size and strength of the core safety net. In addition,
at least 14 states have “community benefits” laws or
regulations which require certain hospitals and/or man-
aged care organizations (MCOs) to offer some sort of
public goods, including charity care.19 It is perhaps useful
to conceptualize the core safety net and other health care
providers in a given locality as a series of concentric
circles. (As noted above, in some rural areas, virtually
every provider assumes some safety-net role.)
Local Variation in Safety Nets
As noted above, there is no national health care
safety net, but rather a collection of regional or local
safety nets. Baxter and Mechanic observe:
The overwhelming evidence is that safety nets are
local. There is no one “safety net” that an observer can
point to. The interaction of composition, concentra-
tion, financing, and community context defines each
local safety net. Thus it is difficult to talk about
whether “the safety net is in crisis,” since there is little
consistency across communities. . . . Ultimately, it is
local factors, played out in the context of state policies
and regional economic trends against the backdrop of
federal policy, that determines the nature of local
safety nets and their stability or vulnerability.
A number of factors contribute to the relative strength
or weakness of a local safety net. These include elements
as basic as the political culture of a community as re-
flected in its predisposition to assist the indigent and the
uninsured. The adequacy of employer-based health
insurance and the comprehensiveness of state Medicaid
and SCHIP coverage as well as any other available
publicly subsidized coverage obviously affect the level of
demand placed on local safety-net providers. The compo-
nents of the local economy and the local unemployment
rate are also factors in this equation. A number of charac-
teristics of the local population—including its per capita
income, the concentration of immigrants, and its racial
and ethnic composition—also contribute to the demands
it places on the safety net. Finally, payment rates are key,
with the penetration of managed care and the competitive-
ness of health care markets locally affecting the ability of
local providers to cross-subsidize those without any or
without adequate insurance coverage.
There are two major private and one major public
demonstration grant program predicated on a recogni-
tion of the essentially local nature of the safety net:
 The W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s Community Voices
Program. Launched in August 1998 to help ensure
the survival of safety-net providers and to strengthen
community support services, this initiative seeks to
help reduce the number of people without health
care coverage and utilize community-based re-
sources to reach those who most often slip through
the holes in the safety net. Five-year grants were
made to assist “local laboratories” in 13 different
sites.
 The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s Communi-
ties in Charge Program. One-year organization and
planning grants were awarded to 20 communities in
January 2000. These grants allowed communities to
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research their uninsured problems, develop strong
community-wide consortia, review potential solu-
tions, and begin to design delivery and financing
systems. Recently, the foundation announced that
three-year Phase II grants of $700,000 each were
awarded to 14 of these communities to implement
plans to put the programs into action.
 The Health Resources Services Administration’s
Community Access Program (CAP). According to a
recent press release, “the CAP initiative seeks to
expand access for the uninsured by increasing the
effectiveness and capacity of the nation’s health care
safety net at the community level.” Following a
highly competitive bidding process, HRSA an-
nounced its first round of 23 awards under the CAP
program to local entities in 22 states on September
7, 2000; the awards totaled $22,020,954 and aver-
aged $957,433. On February 4, 2001, HRSA an-
nounced the availability of $40 million in additional
fiscal year (FY) 2001 funds under CAP for new
grantees on a competitive basis. ($56 million in FY
2001 funds were also made available to fund 53 FY
2000 applicants that were recommended for ap-
proval by HRSA but not funded previously because
of budget constraints.)20
The common strengths of these three programs
include a willingness to respect local decision-making
processes and to allow communities to do local
problem-solving. Local business, health care, and
community leaders have contributed innovative ideas
about how to use funds already in the health care
system more effectively, while cutting down on duplica-
tion and waste in the interests of serving more people.
TARGET POPULATION:
THE UNINSURED
While safety-net providers serve a broader popula-
tion than the uninsured—including the underinsured,
Medicaid beneficiaries, and all those who experience
difficulty in obtaining health care, regardless of their
insurance status—several factors argue for focusing
attention on the uninsured. As the IOM report points
out, it is the growing numbers of uninsured Americans
that has put unusual pressure on safety-net providers. In
addition, many of the factors that cause uninsurance
also appear to contribute to difficulties in the access to
health care of other populations. Finally, far better data
are available on the phenomenon of uninsurance than
on underinsurance.
In 1999, 42.6 million Americans—or 15.5 percent of
the population—lacked health insurance. This was the
equivalent of slightly more than the combined popula-
tions of the states of New York, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Connecticut. Because the uninsured are
heavily concentrated in the below-poverty income
group, with few resources to pay for medical expenses
out-of-pocket, they are heavily dependent on safety-net
providers. Although the uninsured are a heterogeneous
group, making it difficult to generalize about them, they
share some major characteristics.
Uninsurance and Employment
Paul Fronstin of the Employee Benefit Research
Institute points out the salience of one particular factor:
Employment status is the most important determinant of
health insurance coverage. Almost two-thirds of the
nonelderly population have employment-based cover-
age. This coverage can be obtained either directly
through one’s employer/union or previous employer or
indirectly through an employed person in one’s family.21
Ironically, however, as a Washington Post reporter
noted last fall: “Among people below the poverty
line . . . working actually reduced a person’s chance of
having health insurance. About 60 percent of the non-
working poor were insured, compared with 53 percent
of those who had jobs.”22 As much as anything, this
relates to the poor fringe benefits available to low-wage
workers. Charles Kahn and Ronald Pollack describe the
dilemma of such workers as follows:
Low-wage workers experience a “triple whammy”:
They are less likely to be offered coverage by their
employers, they have to pay considerably more for
coverage when employers do offer it, and they have
the least discretionary income available to pay for it.23
Uninsurance and Poverty
In general, those with household incomes below the
poverty line are more likely to be uninsured, as demon-
strated in Table 1 (see page 10).
Despite the existence of public health insurance
programs targeted to indigent Americans, it is important
to remember that none of the nation’s public programs—
not even Medicaid—pretends to cover all Americans
below the federal poverty line. Fronstin points out that
although many individuals in poor families are cov-
ered by public health plans, that coverage is far from
universal. In 1999, 43.8 percent of the nonelderly with
family incomes below the poverty line were covered
by a public plan—40.9 percent by Medicaid.
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Table 1
Uninsurance Rate of Nonelderly,
by Poverty Level, 1998




300%+  9% 
Source: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Uninsured in America: A Chart Book, 2nd ed. (Washington,
D.C.: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2000).
Furthermore, part of the problem is enrolling people
who are indeed eligible. Research from the Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities issued in December 2000
found the following:
A recent analysis of Census data . . . finds that 94
percent of all uninsured children with family incomes
below twice the poverty line—currently $28,300 for
a family of three—qualify for Medicaid or a separate
child health insurance program supported by SCHIP
funds. [This translates into 6.7 million of 7.1 million
uninsured children at this income level.] . . . The
notable exception [is] certain immigrant children.24
The biggest gap in Medicaid coverage is for low-
income nonaged adults. A recent article in Health
Affairs noted:
Although states have the option to include parents in
Medicaid, in thirty-two states uninsured working
parents are ineligible for Medicaid if they work full
time at the minimum wage ($5.15 per hour). Equally
important, low-income childless parents, no matter
how poor, are ineligible for coverage under federal
law unless they qualify as disabled. Without changes
in federal law, Medicaid is unlikely to reach the bulk
of uninsured adults—the vast majority of the low-
income uninsured.25
Uninsurance and Age
With the exception of those over age 65, there is
some relationship between an individual’s age and his
or her likelihood of being uninsured. (Because of the
existence of the Medicare program, almost everyone
over age 65—about 96 percent—has at least some
health insurance coverage.)
Among American children—those age 18 and
under—about 10 million, or just under 14 percent, were
uninsured in 1999. These figures represented a decline
from 11.1 million, or 15.4 percent, in 1998.26
The 1999 Commonwealth Fund National Survey of
Workers’ Health Insurance found that nearly one of five
adults aged 18 to 64 was uninsured.27 Fronstin reports,
“Individuals ages 45–54 were less likely to be unin-
sured (13.4 percent), and individuals ages 21–24 were
more likely to be uninsured (33.4 percent), than those in
all other age groups in 1999.”28
Race, Ethnicity, Place of Birth, Citizenship
Status, and Uninsurance
Another important correlate of uninsurance is an
individual’s race or ethnic background. About 14 percent
of white Americans are uninsured, but the percentage for
Americans of color is considerably higher.
 While Latinos represent about 12 percent of the total
population of the U.S., they constitute one-quarter of
the nation’s uninsured. Almost 40 percent of Latinos
are uninsured, the highest rate for any racial or
ethnic group.29
 Twenty-three percent of African Americans are
uninsured. That rate is more than 1.5 times that
among whites, primarily because of differences in
employer-based coverage.30
 Roughly 21 percent of Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders are uninsured, again because of lesser
likelihood of having job-based insurance coverage.31
 Over 27 percent of American Indians and Alaska
Natives are uninsured, nearly twice the rate of
whites.32
Place of birth and immigrant status are also closely
related to uninsurance status:
 The foreign-born population was more likely than
the native population to be uninsured, 33.4 percent
versus 13.5 percent.
 With respect to immigrant status, Fronstin reports: 
Citizenship is a primary factor in the likelihood of
an individual having coverage and in the source of
that coverage. . . . More than 45 percent of non-
elderly respondents indicating that they were
noncitizens were uninsured in 1999, compared
with 16.5 percent of citizens. . . . High uninsured
rates may be due in part to the fact that a higher
proportion of noncitizens were in low-income
families, were likely to be nonworkers, or were
likely to work in small firms.
Major Reasons for Uninsurance
The Kaiser chart book also presents some revealing
data on the single most important reason that individu-
als cite for uninsurance (Table 2).
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Table 2
Most Important Reason for Not Having
Health Insurance*
It is too expensive 47%
Your job doesn’t offer coverage 15%
You are between jobs or unemployed 15%
You can’t get coverage or were refused 5%
You don’t think you need it 3%
Other 15%
*Reported by uninsured adults.
Source: The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer/Kaiser Family
Foundation National Survey on the Uninsured 2000.
ACCESS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
UNINSURANCE
Not surprisingly, uninsurance—and related condi-
tions, such as underinsurance and irregular connections
with health care providers—have adverse consequences
for individuals’ health status, especially if these individ-
uals are confronted by episodes of serious illness. As in
so much of the picture, the best available evidence is for
uninsurance, where the situation is the starkest.
Altman, Reinhardt, and Shields report a noteworthy
statistic, based on a 1993 Congressional Budget Office
report:
It is known from prior research that, after adjusting
for other socio-economic factors such as income,
family status, and geographic residence, uninsured
Americans receive on average only about 60 percent
of the health services received by insured Americans.
A variety of factors account for this disparity. For
example, Kaiser Commission data indicate that, while
9 percent of insured Americans could not identify a
regular source of health care, 36 percent of uninsured
Americans could not do so—a fourfold difference.
A number of sources document barriers to care
confronted by the uninsured; again and again, these
seem to boil down primarily to insufficient financial
resources. In 1997, unpaid medical debts were the
fourth most often mentioned reason for personal bank-
ruptcy in the United States.33 A recent Commonwealth
Fund report, Can’t Afford to Get Sick: A Reality for
Millions of Working Americans, documents what the
combination of precarious personal financial circum-
stances and uninsurance does to access to care:
 Uninsured adults were [almost] three times as
likely as insured adults to have gone without a
needed doctor visit, not filled a prescription, or
not followed up on a recommended medical test
or treatment in the past year because of an inabil-
ity to pay (49% vs. 18%).
 Nearly one of four (24%) adults said they had not
visited a doctor when sick, had not followed up
on a recommended medical test or treatment, or
had not filled a prescription in the past year
because of the cost.
The Kaiser Commission provides additional evidence
of the deleterious effects of lack of insurance on access:
 The chances of uninsured children who are in-
jured receiving medical attention are 30 percent
less than children who have insurance.
 Uninsured adults often forego even recommended
treatment. At least 30 percent did not fill a pre-
scription or skipped a medical test or treatment in
the past year because of its cost.
 Problems with access to care are worse for those
with the greatest medical needs—those not in
good health. For example, two-thirds of uninsured
adults in fair or poor health have problems getting
medical care.
 The majority of uninsured pregnant women do
not begin their prenatal care in the first trimester
as recommended. They are more than twice as
likely not to receive the standard number of visits
before delivery. Contrary to a belief that unin-
sured people are able to get care when they truly
need it, 15 percent of uninsured mothers have
prenatal care refused them when looking for a
provider.
Perhaps most striking of all is evidence on how
some conditions worsen because of the lack of timely
medical attention, resulting in both needless suffering
to individual patients and avoidable costs to the medical
system. The Kaiser Commission reports: “The unin-
sured are hospitalized at least 50 percent more often
than the insured for ‘avoidable hospital conditions’ like
pneumonia and uncontrolled diabetes.”
A revealing piece of research showing how lack of
health insurance coverage affects individual families
was reported by Nancy Vuckovic of the Kaiser Perma-
nente Center for Health Research in the July/August
2000 issue of Health Affairs.34 In a study of 18 unin-
sured women and their families in southern Arizona,
she sought answers to the following questions:
What strategies do . . . families [without health insur-
ance] use in their daily efforts to maintain health and
respond to illness? . . . What priorities do they set?
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What risks—both to their own health and to the
public’s health—do they take in attempting to treat
themselves?
Among Vuckovic’s principal findings were that
caring for their own health and that of family mem-
bers was a time-intensive task that required ingenuity
and persistence. As one woman put it: “You have to
be so damn creative when you don’t have medical
benefits.” When it was necessary to allocate limited
financial resources to health care, women used strate-
gies for triaging and responding to illness that in-
cluded finding information and health care resources
“through the grapevine,” setting priorities for who
gets care, and treating illnesses with pharmaceuticals
that they could borrow, stockpile, or get from “under-
the-counter” sources.
The women found that “social networks” offered an
important resource for information and advice in
general, as well as a means of financial and social
support and a source of medications and information
about how to obtain free or reduced-cost medical care.
They lived under continual stress as a result of the
threat of illness or accident, compounded by the day-to-
day problem of securing health care for themselves and
their families.
Vuckovic’s conclusions have potential implications
beyond the scope of her study:
For the women I interviewed, being without health
insurance magnified their health concerns and
prompted them to take a very active role in their
health care. While their self-reliant attempts to “do
what you can do” in response to illness are laudable,
we cannot ignore the health hazards that accompany
lack of access to resources or appropriate information.
Risks associated with drug interaction, side effects,
treating conditions in insufficient ways, and lack of
monitoring of medication use can have a detrimental
effect on personal health. These behaviors may also
have wider-ranging effects on public health, such as
drug resistance and masked but uncured contagious
diseases. These risks are typically absent from discus-
sions about the personal and health system costs
resulting from lack of insurance.
While some of these concerns might have been
obviated by linking these women and their families with
safety-net providers, this may have been difficult in
southern Arizona.
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE
SAFETY NET
As noted above, the safety net derives revenue from
a number of sources, both direct and indirect. These
include public funds such as Medicaid and Medicare,
special federal grant-in-aid programs, state and local
subsidies, private insurance payments, and cross-
subsidies from various payers.
Medicaid
Medicaid revenues flow to safety-net providers
through a number of channels—as direct payments for
patient care, as capitation or case management pay-
ments under managed care arrangements, or as indirect
subsidies such as DSH payments or GME payments.
Furthermore, federal law has stipulated requirements for
Medicaid payments to certain types of safety-net
providers—in particular, FQHCs, which include
community and migrant health centers and similar
clinics.
Because of the salience of Medicaid revenues in
their budgets, safety-net providers have been especially
vigilant about any threats to their Medicaid funds. Since
1989, state Medicaid programs have been required to
pay community and migrant health centers and other
FQHCs under a cost-based reimbursement mandate.
(Prior to the enactment of the mandate, state Medicaid
agencies could pay these providers no differently than
other providers—typically discounted reimbursement.)
Medicaid now represents about one-third of health
centers’ total revenues. When the Balanced Budget Act
(BBA) of 1997 included provisions to phase out cost-
based reimbursement, these safety-net providers mobi-
lized to prevent any changes. First, the Balanced Budget
Recovery Act (BBRA) of 1999 provided some relief,
delaying implementation of the phase-out and mandat-
ing a study to determine how FQHCs should be paid in
the future. Then, in the Medicare, Medicaid, and
SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
(BIPA) of 2000, FQHCs were able to get a Medicaid
prospective payment system that offers them reimburse-
ment levels no lower than those they previously re-
ceived under full-cost reimbursement. This victory on
the part of FQHCs is noteworthy, however, for its unique-
ness; no other safety-net providers have been able to attain
similar accommodations within the Medicaid program,
although some, such as nursing centers, continue to seek
it. Over time, cost-based reimbursement has been a sore
point with many state Medicaid agencies, who have felt
that the special provision was unwarranted in relation to
other providers.
Another special Medicaid reimbursement mecha-
nism for safety-net providers, the DSH program, was
initially intended to subsidize hospitals that provided
high volumes of care to indigent patients not eligible for
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Medicaid. Some states have distributed the funds over
a broader set of hospitals than those that really belong
to the safety net under even the broadest definition. At
best, the DSH program has had a rather checkered history,
since many states once used it as a vehicle to channel the
flow of increased federal revenues into state coffers
without increasing state outlays. Congress then limited
this practice through the enactment of the Medicaid
Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax
Amendments of 1991.35 Further DSH budget cuts were
enacted in subsequent years, including those in the BBA
in 1997, which were partially restored by BIPA of 2000.
The Medicaid DSH program’s funding is no longer open-
ended. Nonetheless, many safety-net providers depend
heavily on the DSH program for support; for example, 34
percent of unreimbursed care at NAPH hospitals in 1998
was funded from Medicaid DSH funds, the second most
important source after state-local subsidies (39 percent).36
According to the Congressional Budget Office, DSH
spending is projected to represent about 6.5 percent of
total FY 2001 federal Medicaid spending.
Another indirect Medicaid subsidy is GME payments.
A survey conducted under the aegis of the National
Conference of State Legislatures found that all but five
states paid for GME through Medicaid in 1998 and that
these Medicaid GME payments totaled $2.4 billion.37
Medicare
Under the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1985, provision was made for special
payments to hospitals that served a high percentage of
Medicare and low-income patients—the Medicare DSH
adjustment. The legislation amended the 1983 statute
that established the Medicare prospective payment
system. According to the Congressional Budget Office,
however, Medicare DSH payments are proportionately
much less important to safety-net hospitals than are
Medicaid DSH payments. In 1997, Medicare DSH
payments totaled approximately $4.5 billion, while
Medicaid DSH payments equaled $16 billion.
Under the Medicare inpatient hospital PPS system,
teaching hospitals—which typically play an important
safety-net role—are also given allowances for direct
and indirect graduate medical education expenses. The
IME portion helps underwrite their charity care. In FY
1996, IME payments totaling $4.3 billion went to 1,061
teaching hospitals.
Cross-Subsidies and Uncompensated Care
One of the basic elements of the financial viability
of the heath care safety net is providers’ ability to cross-
subsidize the care of those who lack health insurance
coverage and/or the ability to pay for their care. They
accomplish this cross-subsidy by charging the cost of
that care to the surpluses that accrue from care charged
to other third-party payers, principally private insurers.
The term for this form of financial alchemy is “uncom-
pensated care” or “charity care,” and the concept has a
dual purpose in discussions of the safety net:
Uncompensated care—the amount of care written off
by hospitals or other providers—is generally taken as
a measure of both the need for care among persons
unable to pay and the willingness and ability of health
care providers to make such care available. Although
uncompensated care is far from a perfect indicator of
access, it has become a standard measure for tracking
provision of care for the medically indigent.38
To some degree, all types of health care providers offer
uncompensated care. However, the most reliable data
on uncompensated care are available for hospitals. A
number of recent studies rank hospitals according to the
relative amount of uncompensated care they provide. In
doing so, they offer a measure of the extent to which
safety-net responsibilities are concentrated or dispersed
among general hospitals.
In a July/August 1997 article in Health Affairs,
Linda Fishman, then associate vice president for gov-
ernmental relations at the American Association of
Medical Colleges (AAMC), ranked 5,229 community
hospitals by deciles according to the relative amount of
uncompensated care they provided in 1994. Among her
findings are the following:
 Many hospitals claim to be part of the safety
net. . . . However, there is substantial dispersion in
the concentration and dispersion of responsibility for
indigent care and graduate medical education [which
often serves as a proxy for indigent care].
 A substantial percentage of private hospitals, which
includes church-sponsored and private hospitals that
probably receive little funding from state and local
governments, maintains a relatively heavy uncom-
pensated care burden.
 Hospitals with the highest concentration of uncom-
pensated care had more Medicaid inpatient days (31
percent of all days) and fewer Medicare inpatient
days (33 percent) than did hospitals in the other nine
deciles (19 percent and 46 percent respectively).
 Despite public financial support structures for uncom-
pensated care, such as disproportionate share pay-
ments in both the Medicare and Medicaid programs
and other support from state and local governments,
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the 523 hospitals that carried a particularly large
uncompensated care burden relative to their opera-
tions were in a worse financial position in 1994 than
other hospitals were. This raises questions about how
well the current support structures are working.39
The latter point seems to confirm concerns raised by the
IOM report.
Other researchers have looked at different measures
than uncompensated care as proxies for safety-net
linkage or membership. In 1996, Georgetown Univer-
sity’s Institute for Health Care Research and Policy
estimated the existence of some 369 “urban safety-net
hospitals” in the nation, using HCFA’s definition of
Medicaid patient volume of more than one standard
deviation above the mean. (Of these 369, 33 percent
were public, 57 percent private nonprofit, and 10
percent investor-owned.) As an alternative, the Lewin
Group suggested that there were 696 hospitals that met
the optional Medicaid definition of a greater than 25-
percent “low-income utilization rate.”40
A paper published by the Johns Hopkins Center for
Hospital Finance and Management in August 1998
suggested that the major share of hospital uncompensated
care has shifted from public to private hospitals for a
number of reasons. These include a decline in state and
local subsidies to public hospitals for uncompensated care
as well as the greater availability of DSH subsidies and
uncompensated care pools to private hospitals.41 It is
important to note, too, that some hospitals have switched
from public to community ownership in order to have
greater governance and management flexibility.
At the same time, the spread of various managed
care arrangements and attention to controlling outlays-
—among both private and public third-party pay-
ers—are undoubtedly constraining safety-net providers’




As noted above, the IOM report identified three
major challenges confronting the health care safety net:
 The impact of Medicaid managed care in a more
competitive health care marketplace.
 The erosion and uncertainty of major direct and
indirect subsidies that have helped support safety-
net functions.
 The rising number of uninsured Americans.
As the IOM report notes, the particular difficulty of
these challenges is that they are confronting safety-net
providers concurrently. However, even in the rela-
tively short time since the release of the IOM report in
March 2000, some of the landscape affecting the
safety net has changed.
Looking at the situation from a longer-term perspec-
tive, it is perhaps worth remembering that its compo-
nent providers have seldom been in a comfortable
financial position. In a paper published by the Urban
Institute in September 1998, Stephen Norton and Debra
Lipson observed: “Ultimately, the safety net is never
fully supported, as the institutions are not fully compen-
sated for care to the uninsured. Thus, no matter how
high or low the level of pressure they experience, these
institutions will be under some stress.”42
The question, then, is less one of whether the safety
net is in a state of crisis—it seems perpetually
so—than one of how serious the difficulties are and
how likely the safety net is to withstand them. What
Linda Fishman and James Bentley, then at the AAMC,
had to say about hospitals in general applies equally to
safety-net providers of all kinds:
Now the health care system is transforming from one
based on a delicate web of confusing cross-subsidies
to a system based on price competition in which both
private and public purchasers want to pay only for the
cost of the services their enrollees receive. Pressure to
curb the rate of growth in state and federal health care
spending threatens to erode the existing public sup-
port mechanisms for uncompensated care and GME.
The question in the current competitive environment
is whether, how, and to what extent society will
continue to support the additional roles of hospitals
that now are funded with patient care revenue.43
Managed Care and Competition
While the IOM report zeroes in on Medicaid man-
aged care as a particular threat to the safety net, cer-
tainly the larger phenomenon of managed care in both
the private and public sectors threatens the ability of
safety-net providers to shift costs among providers and
thereby fund uncompensated care. This problem, which
transcends Medicaid, is characterized by the American
College of Emergency Physicians’ (ACEPs’) Wesley
Fields as follows: “The price elasticity of the fee-for-
service era that allowed community facilities to perform
safety-net functions is largely eliminated by MCOs’
efforts to control their own costs.”44
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But it is managed care under Medicaid that poses the
greatest threat for safety-net providers. Among the
immediate results the IOM report highlights are a
decline in Medicaid revenues related to the diversion of
Medicaid patients to other providers and lower payments
by Medicaid managed care plans. Many critics contend
that state Medicaid agencies have been so narrowly
bottom-line-oriented that they have made inadequate
provisions for safety-net providers; one laments: “The
trend has been to implement managed care first and iron
out the kinks later.” He and others point out, for exam-
ple, the ill effects of TennCare on the Regional Medical
Center in Memphis and on Meharry Medical College in
Nashville as examples of Medicaid managed care run
amok. Others suggest that TennCare is an extreme
example and that a number of states have made special
provisions for incorporating safety-net providers into
their Medicaid managed care programs.
Focusing primarily on hospitals, Fishman and
Bentley observe:
The shift of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees to man-
aged care distorts the integrity of the current fee-for-
service support mechanisms. . . . The rates that the plan
negotiates with the hospital do not necessarily include
the DSH, DGME [direct general medical education], or
IME [indirect medical education] payments that would
be made to the hospital if the beneficiary remained in
the fee-for-service system. Alternatively, the risk plan
may direct patients away from the teaching or DSH
hospital to a lower-cost site of care because the plan
receives the same capitation rate regardless of the
provider with whom it has a contract.
In some states, there is some very preliminary
evidence that Medicaid managed care is unraveling, as
a combination of states’ ratcheting down on the rates
that they pay health plans and the associated withdrawal
of managed care organizations—especially private
plans—may mark the commencement of a new phase of
Medicaid payment and organization.45 What remains to
be seen, however, is how the timing of these changes
will affect safety-net providers.
Similarly, capitated managed care may have
reached its zenith among private purchasers as well.
As part of the general “managed care backlash,” both
private employers and their employees seem to be
turning away from traditional HMOs in favor of
preferred provider organizations, point-of-service
plans, and more or less strongly managed indemnity
arrangements. It may be that the day of rigorously
gatekept, closed panel, shared risk managed care has
come and gone. If so, some of the threat to safety-net
providers may be subsiding.
Related to the managed care phenomenon is the
unusually competitive health care environment in many
localities where, for the first time, hospital inpatient and
outpatient departments have actually been competing
for Medicaid patients—often to the detriment of safety-
net providers, who in the process lose these patients and
the associated Medicaid revenues on which they de-
pend. In its article on Bellevue Hospital, for which one
of the hospital’s registration clerks was interviewed, the
New York Times Magazine reported:
In 1975, Bellevue was the dump for indigent Medic-
aid patients that voluntary hospitals would not treat.
Now, however, facing rising costs and empty beds,
the same voluntary hospitals have become insurance
blind. The result is brutal competition for Medicaid
patients, whom [the clerk] follows the way a bookie
follows the races. . . . As voluntary hospitals and
managed care siphon off Medicaid patients, Bellevue
winds up with the uninsured no one else wants to
treat—and less and less income to offset the cost. “We
are begging for Medicaid patients,” [the clerk] said.
Gage indicates that NAPH member hospitals have seen
a dramatic decline in the number of babies delivered,
since private hospitals have increasingly sought to
compete for Medicaid patients. Between 1990 and 1997,
the number of births declined by more than 36 percent
(or nearly 1,800) at the average NAPH member hospital.
An important piece of the Medicaid equation is the
significant amount of churning that occurs in the Medic-
aid population over time, as a sizable number of people
go on and off Medicaid eligibility rolls. As the IOM
report points out, safety-net providers have been in a
unique position to accommodate this factor while
assuring continuity of care; whether commercial man-
aged care organizations participating in Medicaid can do
so seems open to question:
The categorical and episodic nature of Medicaid
eligibility means that individuals tend to cycle on and
off insurance, often with long spells of no insurance.
Under the traditional Medicaid program, low-income
individuals and families who lost Medicaid coverage
would continue to see safety-net providers without
much interruption. Private managed care organiza-
tions have no legal responsibility or mission to con-
tinue to support the care of patients when they become
uninsured.
Threats to Direct and Indirect Subsidies
Although the passage of BIPA in 2000 was a victory
for FQHCs, there remain threats to funding for other
safety-net providers. Already, Medicaid budgets in a
number of states seen to be going into deficit, partly
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because of rising pharmaceutical expenses. In a paper
published in February 2001, Brian Bruen and John
Holahan of the Urban Institute issued the following
cautionary note:
Careful monitoring of Medicaid spending is very
important because it is a large part of federal and state
budgets. . . . Some studies suggest that Medicaid
expenditures grew faster after 1998. Growth rates of
Medicaid expenditures in the 10 percent range could
easily occur in the near future because of growth in
health care costs (particularly prescription drugs), the
eroding impact of Medicaid managed care, wage
pressures in the long term care sector, the use of
supplemental payment programs, and enrollment
increases. Growth rates at these levels have potentially
serious fiscal implications for both federal and state
governments and unfortunately could affect willing-
ness of either to pursue expansions of eligibility.46
Further signs of poor prospects for state subsidies
for safety-net providers, both in Medicaid and in
general revenue support, are evidenced in a recent Wall
Street Journal report that as many as 11 states are
showing signs of recessionary conditions. These include
Alabama, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, and West Virginia.47
The NGA proposal for radical restructuring of the
Medicaid program is yet another variable to consider;
by extending eligibility to a broader range of the
population, it may help the safety net, but this is by no
means a foregone conclusion. The restoration of cost-
based reimbursement for FQHCs may only worsen the
plight of some other safety-net providers because states,
constrained by a tendency to zero-sum Medicaid
budgeting, may be less willing to reimburse other
safety-net providers at reasonable levels.
Growth in the Uninsured
From 1987, when the U.S. Census Bureau first
began collecting data on health insurance status,
through 1998, the number of uninsured Americans
increased steadily. During this period, the number of
uninsured nonelderly individuals grew from 31.8
million to 43.9 million, or from 14.8 percent to 18.4
percent of the population. In 1999, primarily because of
the strength of the national economy, the total number
of uninsured nonelderly Americans declined to 42.1
million individuals or 17.5 percent of the population.
As Fronstin points out, however: “Even if the United
States experiences five more years of declines in the
uninsured similar to that in 1999, 34 million Americans
would still be uninsured in 2005.” Such sustained
reductions in the numbers of uninsured Americans seem
unlikely, however.
Several factors must be considered when projecting
trends in the size of the uninsured population. Major
economic and political variables, including the strength
and growth of the national economy, trends in the prices
of private health insurance, and federal and state legisla-
tion affecting such public benefit programs as Medicaid
and Medicare all play a role.
The reduction in the total number of uninsured
Americans from 1998 to 1999 seems anomalous, in that
it coincides with an increase in the costs of employer-
sponsored health benefits. In 2000, the 8.1 percent rise
in health benefits costs marks the third straight year of
growth at more than double the rate of general
inflation.48 Coupled with growing concerns about
weakness in the economy, such as increased unemploy-
ment or reduced consumer confidence, such a sustained
increase in health benefits costs might mark the begin-
ning of a renewed upturn in uninsurance.
On December 14, 2000, the Health Insurance Associa-
tion of America released a study by the Center for Risk
Management and Insurance Research which projects the
level of uninsured Americans through the year 2009
under three different scenarios:49
 An assumption of sustained economic growth and
higher but moderate health care cost inflation would
result in a projection of more than 48 million unin-
sured.
 Employing an assumption of rapid economic growth
but of even more rapid economic cost inflation would
yield a projection of about 55 million uninsured.
 Assuming a recession on the order of that experienced
in the early 1990s, there would be more than 61
million uninsured.
Thus, depending on the assumptions used, the
numbers of uninsured could vary by some 13 million
individuals, with major implications for safety-net
providers. Fronstin suggests: “Should a severe down-
turn in the economy occur, causing the uninsured to
represent 25 percent of the nonelderly population, 63
million Americans would be uninsured [in 2005].”
Assuring that the safety net has the capacity to accom-
modate numbers of this magnitude would obviously
represent a major challenge.
Problems Affecting Emergency Rooms
Emergency rooms are often the provider of first resort
for the uninsured. As the authors of a paper recently
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published by the American College of Emergency
Physicians (ACEP) observe: “Emergency departments
[EDs] are the only element of the health care safety net
whose function has been defined by federal law, the
EMTALA, which mandates that all EDs provide screen-
ing, stabilization, and/or appropriate transfers to all
patients with any medical condition.”50
They further point out:
In contrast to other safety-net providers, EDs define
their mission in terms of unlimited access regardless of
citizenship, insurance status, ability to pay, day of the
week, or time of day. . . . The ED is the only source of
care available for certain populations. The 1996 welfare
reform legislation severed the link between Medicaid
and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, legal
immigrant status, and disability due to substance abuse.
This had a significant impact on health care for the poor
and immigrant populations. . . . EDs were exempted
from these restrictions.
Last October, the New York Times ran a front-page
article entitled “Emergency Room, to Many, Remains the
Doctor’s Office.” In it, the author reported:
Visits to ERs grew about 3 percent a year from 1997 to
1999 and have risen 6 to 8 percent in the last year. . . .
The reasons are similar to those behind other problems
in health care: the lack of access to primary care doctors
among the poorest Americans and a large number of
Americans who are without insurance, often because of
higher premiums.51
At the same time, a number of hospitals are closing
their ERs, largely because of financial pressures. Looking
at trends over a longer period, the ACEP’s Fields notes:
Between 1988 and 1996, ED patient visits rose from
81.3 to 93.1 million, an increase of 14 percent. During
the same period, the number of EDs decreased from
5,210 to 4,740, with ED closures outstripping the rate of
facility closures by 28 percent. . . . The average annual
ED census increased 25.6 percent, from 15,600 in 1988
to 19,600 in 1996.52
The closure of these EDs and the increased volumes at the
remaining EDs threaten the access of those patients who
must rely on the EDs that remain in operation, while
imposing new pressures on the quality of care at those
institutions.
The evidence of financial pressures on individual
hospitals is striking. In an article on Florida ERs last
November, the Wall Street Journal reported: “Statewide,
hospitals swallowed $1.1 billion in medical bills for
patients who couldn’t pay in 1997, the latest year avail-
able. That was a 13% jump in write-offs from five years
earlier.”53
Another New York Times article, published in
December, gives evidence of even more increased
pressures on emergency rooms:
For years it was all but unheard of in most cities for a
hospital to regularly hang out a “No Vacancy” sign for
ambulance crews. But in recent months, in cities from
Boston to San Francisco, Phoenix to Denver, it has
become common to the alarm of doctors, paramedics
and patients. . . . Those voicing their concern most
loudly . . . do worry openly that patient care suffers
because of the extra minutes spent in ambulances and
because of the emergency room crowding that causes
the diversions in the first place.54
There are a variety of reasons why ERs are over-
crowded and ambulances must sometimes be diverted.
Some health plans blame the “prudent layperson” laws
enacted in 33 states, requiring them to pay ER bills if
patients are in great pain and believe that they are in a
medical emergency. The BBA also obligates Medicare
and Medicaid to follow a prudent layperson standard. In
addition, some health plans have abandoned prior
authorization requirements for emergency care. Other
observers assert that patients are experiencing greater
difficulty in getting appointments with primary care
physicians, forcing them to rely on ERs to a greater
extent.55
But one contributing factor is the safety-net role that
ERs must play. According to a recent Commonwealth
Fund study, in New York City, nearly 75 percent of all
visits to an ER that do not result in admissions are for
nonemergencies, reflecting to some degree poor access
to primary care.56 This has highlighted a question of
whether relieving ERs of some of this responsibility
might allow them to better fulfill their emergency roles.
The Times article seems to suggest that the problem is
both widespread and unprecedented:
Diversions have become a year-round problem in
Denver, in Las Vegas, even in smaller cities like
Newport News, Virginia. San Francisco General
Hospital was on diversion 39 percent of the time in
October, and is averaging 31 percent for this year,
compared with 19 percent at this time last year. . . .
And in Massachusetts, the state public health commis-
sioner, Dr. Howard Koh, said, “This past year we saw
diversions in the summer and the fall for the first time
in memory.”
Previously, diversions had been experienced primarily
during the winter flu season.
The implications for quality of care are troublesome,
according to a warning contained in the January 2000
issue of Annals of Emergency Medicine: “Unless the
problem is solved in the near future, the general public
 18 
1. James J. Mongan, “The Forgotten Uninsured,” Washing-
ton Post, October 10, 2000, A25.
2. Marion Ein Lewin and Stuart Altman, eds., America’s
Health Care Safety Net: Intact but Endangered, National
Science Foundation, Institute of Medicine (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 2000), 2.
3. “Congress to Expand Access Focus to Include Safety Net
Programs,” BNA Health Care Policy Report, February 19,
2001, 246.
4. Robert Pear, “Governors Offer ‘Radical’ Revision of
Medicaid Plan,” New York Times, February 26, 2001, A1, A12.
The National Governors’ Association is proposing
radical changes in Medicaid that would allow states to
provides health insurance to millions of additional
people, but the benefits would be less generous than
those now guaranteed to poor people. . . . Many
governors want to help provide coverage to people
who are uninsured. . . . The new policy . . . would still
guarantee a comprehensive package of benefits for the
poorest families, thus “maintaining the health care
safety net for vulnerable populations.”
5. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Fiscal
Outlook for 2001: February Update, posted February 28,
2001, updated March 8, 2001; accessed March 30, 2001, at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/sfo2001.htm. These
states were Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington.
6. Julius B. Richmond and Rashi Fein, “Caring for the
Uninsured and Underinsured: The Health Care Mess,”
Journal of the American Medical Association, 273, no. 1
(January 4, 1995): 71.
7. Charles N. Kahn III and Ronald F. Pollack, “Building a
Consensus for Expanding Health Coverage,” Health Affairs,
January/February 2001, 40.
8. Katherine Eban Finkelstein, “Bellevue’s Emergency,”
New York Times Magazine, February 11, 1996, 52.
9. Raymond J. Baxter and Robert E. Mechanic, “The Status
of Local Health Care Safety Nets,” Health Affairs, July/
August 1997, 9.
10. Haynes Johnson and Davis S. Broder, The System: The
American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1996), 536, 539.
11. For a time, beginning in 1972, voluntary hospitals which
had received Hill-Burton funding were required by federal
regulation to expend 5 percent of their estimated patient
revenues for charity care. See Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness
and in Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Basic Books, 1989), 314-315, 345.
12. Karen Davis and Kathy Schoen, “A New Approach to
Health Care Delivery,” in Health and the War on Poverty: A
Ten-Year Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1978), 165.
13. See Judith D. Moore, “SCHIP in the Formative Years: An
Update,” National Health Policy Forum Issue Brief No. 759,
September 21, 2000, and “CHIP and Medicaid Outreach and
Enrollment: A Hands-On Look at Marketing and Applica-
may no longer be able to rely on EDs for quality and
timely emergency care, placing the people of this
country at risk.”57
THE SAFETY NET IN A LONGER-TERM
CONTEXT
For those who rely on the safety net and for those who
believe it needs to be strengthened, there may be some
signs of positive action. Congress and the administration
have begun to consider ways of strengthening safety net
capacities. These include support for more community
health centers and extension of the National Health
Service Corps. Moreover, proposals to increase levels of
insurance coverage are gaining some currency. These
have been buttressed by discussion about ways to use
current surpluses; some also argue there will be savings
realized through improved access to appropriate care and
through more efficient coordination of providers and
services. Finally, exemplary efforts at the local and state
level are showing that, because of regional variation,
solutions may lie as much in partnerships between the
public and the private sector as in relationships between
the federal government and the states. But how these
deliberations will play out and the level of funding that
might be made available is still very uncertain. Only time
will tell if these incremental efforts, made during yet
another cyclical period of attention, will lead to more
meaningful resolution of the safety net’s operational and
funding dilemmas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments
of the following reviewers: Mary Lou Andersen; Eric
Baumgartner, M.D.; Christine Caputo Burch; Catherine
Dunham; Lynn Etheredge; Robert Hurley; Wilhelmine
Miller; Victor Miller; Susan Nestor Levy; Trish Riley;
and Andy Schneider. Any errors of fact or interpretation
are solely the responsibility of the author.
ENDNOTES
19 
tions,” NHPF Issue Brief No. 748, October 19, 1999.
14. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Resources Services Administration. Bureau of Primary Health
Care, Division of Community and Migrant Health, Experts
with Experience: Community and Migrant Health Centers:
Highlighting a Decade of Service, 1990-2000 (no date).
15. Stuart H. Altman, Uwe E. Reinhardt, and Alexandra E.
Shields, “Healthcare for the Poor and Uninsured: An Uncer-
tain Future,” in The Future U.S. Health Care System: Who
Will Care for the Poor and Uninsured? ed. Stuart H. Altman,
Uwe E. Reinhardt, and Alexandra E. Shields (Chicago:
Health Administration Press, 1998), 7.
16. Gage, “Safety Net Hospitals,” 126.
17. Eileen R. Ellis, Vernon K. Smith, and David M. Rous-
seau, Medicaid Enrollment in 50 States, June 1997 to
December 1999, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, October 2000.
18. Thomas Chapman, “It’s Time to Strengthen the Safety
Net,” Modern Healthcare, June 19, 2000, 28.
19. Natalie Seto and Bess Karger Weiskopf, Community
Benefits: The Need for Action, an Opportunity for Healthcare
Change, A Workbook for Grassroots Leaders and Community
Organizations (Boston, MA: The Access Project, 2000), page
94; accessed March 21, 2001 at http://www.accessproject.org/
publications.htm. The states are California, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Utah, and West Virginia.
20. The CAP program had single-year appropriations in FY
2000 and FY 2001. As of this writing, it has been zeroed out
of the proposed FY 2002 budget.
21. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Charac-
teristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2000
Current Population Survey, Employee Benefit Research
Institute Issue Brief No. 228, December 2000, 7.
22. David Brown, “Percentage of Uninsured Dropped in
1999,” Washington Post, September 29, 2000, A5.
23. Kahn and Pollack, “Building a Consensus,” 44.
24. Matthew Broaddus and Leighton Ku, Nearly 95 Percent
of Low-Income Uninsured Children Now Are Eligible for
Medicaid or SCHIP: Measures Need to Increase Enrollment
Among Eligible but Uninsured Children, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, December 6, 2000; accessed on March
2, 2001 at http://www.cbpp.org/12-6-00schip.htm.
25. Judith Feder et al., “Covering the Low-Income Unin-
sured: The Case for Expanding Public Programs,” Health
Affairs, January/February 2001, 22.
26. Since they affect state allocations under the SCHIP
program, data on the number of uninsured children have been
a source of particular contention.
27. John Budetti et al., Can’t Afford to Get Sick: A Reality for
Millions of Working Americans (New York: Commonwealth
Fund, September 1999), 1.
28. Among the reasons that younger people tend to be
uninsured is that they reject available employer-sponsored
insurance because they believe they are less prone to illness.
29. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care Among
Latinos, Key Facts, June 2000. Among nonelderly Latinos,
the uninsurance rate, by area of origin, varied as follows:
Central and South American, 42 percent; Mexican, 39
percent; Cuban, 21 percent; Puerto Rican, 21 percent, and
Total Hispanics, 37 percent. See Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, Uninsured in America: A Chart
Book, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, May 2000), 21.
30. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care Among
African Americans, Key Facts, June 2000.
31. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care Among Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders, Key Facts, June 2000.
32. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Health Insurance Coverage:
1999, September 28, 2000.
33. John D. Banja, “The Improbable Future of Employment-
Based Insurance,” Hastings Center Report 30, no. 3 (May-
June 2000): 22.
34. Nancy Vuckovic, “Self-Care Among the Uninsured: ‘You
Do What You Can Do,’” Health Affairs, July/August 2000,
197-199.
35. See Karen R. Matherlee, “The Federal-State Medicaid
Match: An Ongoing Tug-of-War over Practice and Policy,”
National Health Policy Forum Issue Brief No. 760, December
15, 2000.
36. National Association of Public Hospitals and Health
Systems, How Are Safety Net Hospitals Financed? Who Pays
for “Free Care”? NAPH Issue Brief, February 2001.
37. Tim H. Henderson, “Medicaid’s Role in Financing
Graduate Medical Education,” Health Affairs, January/
February 2000, 221-229. Only 16 states and the District of
Columbia carve out Medicaid GME payments from their
capitated rates paid to managed care plans and rechannel
them directly to teaching programs.
38. Graham Atkinson, W. David Helms, and Jack Needle-
man, “State Trends in Hospital Uncompensated Care,” Health
Affairs, July/August 1997, 233.
39. Linda E. Fishman, “What Types of Hospitals Form the
Safety Net?” Health Affairs July/August 1997, 215, 218, 219,
221.
40. Gage, “Safety Net Hospitals,” 126.
 20 
41. Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Center for Hospital
Finance and Management, Discovering the Healthcare Safety
Net, August 18, 1998.
42. Stephen A. Norton and Debra J. Lipson, Public Policy,
Market Forces, and the Viability of Safety Net Providers,
Occasional Paper 13, Urban Institute, September 1998, 2;
accessed October 10, 2000 at http://newfederalism.urban.org
/html/occa13.html.
43. Linda E. Fishman and James D. Bentley, “The Evolution
of Support for Safety-Net Hospitals,” Health Affairs, July/
August 1997, 31.
44. Wesley Fields, “Defining America’s Safety Net,” in
Defending America’s Safety Net, ed. Wesley Fields (Dallas:
American College of Emergency Physicians, 1999), 9.
45. See, for example, Robert Cunningham, “The Uninsured:
Local Efforts in State, Federal, Global Contexts,” Medicine
& Health Perspectives, February 21, 2000, 1-4, which reports
on research on the exit of commercial plans in 1997 and
1998. See also Michael J. McCue et al., “Reversal of Fortune:
Commercial HMOs in the Medicaid Market,” Health Affairs,
January/February 1999, 223-230.
46. Brian Bruen and John Holahan, Medicaid Spending
Growth Remained Modest in 1998, But Likely Headed
Upward, Issue Paper, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured, Washington, D.C., February 2001, 15.
47. Ken Gepfert, “Cross Country: For Some States, Recession
May Be Here,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2001; accessed
March 29, 2001, at http://www.wsj.com.
48. “Mercer/Foster Higgins National Survey of Employer-
Sponsored Health Plans,” Medical Benefits, January 30, 2001,
1.
49. William S. Custer and Pat Ketsche, The Changing
Sources of Health Insurance (Washington, D.C.: Health
Insurance Association of America, no date).
50. Patrick M. O’Brien et al., “The Emergency Department as
a Public Safety Net,” in Defending America’s Safety Net, ed.
Wesley Fields (Dallas: American College of Emergency
Physicians, 1999), 19-21.
51. Jennifer Steinhauer, “Emergency Room, to Many,
Remains the Doctor’s Office,” New York Times, October 25,
2000, A1, A25.
52. Wesley Fields, “Executive Summary,” in Defending
America’s Safety Net, ed. Wesley Fields (Dallas: American
College of Emergency Physicians, 1999), 2.
53. Trebor Banstetter, “Group Mulls Big Changes to Help
ERs,” Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2000, F1.
54. Carey Goldberg, “Emergency Crews Worry as Hospitals
Say, ‘No Vacancy,” New York Times, December 17, 2000,
A27.
55. See Leigh Page, “Patients Bypassing Doctors for Emer-
gency Care,” American Medical News, February 12, 2001, 1-2.
56. John Billings, Nina Parikh, and Tod Mijanovich, Emer-
gency Department Use: The New York Story, Commonwealth
Fund Issue Brief, November 2000.
57. Robert W. Derlet and John R. Richards, “Overcrowding
in the Nation’s Emergency Departments: Complex Causes
and Disturbing Effects,” Annals of Emergency Medicine,
January 2000, 63. Some ERs across the country have insti-
tuted special triage programs that allow them to transfer less
seriously ill patients to affiliate primary care clinics to relieve
some of the pressure on the ER while assuring that these
patients receive timely attention for their medical complaints.
